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This article is initially concerned with a famous constraint on the class
of possible determiners in natural languages: the so-called Conservativity
Constraint. We shall briefly illustrate the force of this constraint and infor-
mally sketch Keenan and Stavi (1986)’s view according to which the Con-
servativity Constraint derives from the boolean structure of natural lan-
guage semantics. We shall proceed to discuss certain well-known linguistic
categories that have been argued to be interpreted by non-conservative
functions: only and the relative proportional determiners many and few.
We shall take the challenge posed by the existence of these categories in
order to propose an alternative to the Conservativity Constraint. This
alternative will be dubbed the Witness Set Constraint, which is inspired
in Barwise and Cooper (1981)’s considerations on the semantic process-
ing of generalized quantifiers. We shall defend that the proposed con-
straint does not suffer from the empirical shortcomings that have been
attributed to the Conservativity Constraint, and indeed, we shall argue
in detail that it correctly predicts (a) the existence of conservative de-
terminers, (b) the non-existence of certain non-conservative determiners,
such as inner negations, cardinal comparison determiners and the con-
verses of non-trivial proportional determiners, and most importantly, (c)
the existence of the non-conservative functions denoted by only and the
relative proportional determiners many and few. This line of reasoning
suggests that the class of functions from properties to sets of properties
denoted in natural languages typically by determiners is constrained by a
principle that simplifies the semantic processing of generalized quantifiers.
1 Introduction
As has been clear since Montague (1974), it is possible to characterize quantifica-
tion in natural languages using the concept of generalized quantifier, introduced
in logic by Mostowski (1955) and Lindström (1966).
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Given a (non-empty) set U –the universe domain of a model–, we shall refer
to the subsets of U as properties (of elements of U ). The set of properties
over U is, naturally, the set of all subsets of U, i.e., the power set of U : P(U).
A set of properties over U is called a generalized quantifier; accordingly, a
generalized quantifier is a subset of P(U). As a result, the set of generalized
quantifiers over U is the set of all subsets of P(U), namely the power set of
P(U): P(P(U)). We thus adhere to the following standard definition:
Definition 1. Generalized quantifier
Given a (non-empty) universe domain U, a generalized quantifier over U is a
member of P(P(U)).
For instance, for a universe domain U, if A is a subset of U denoted by a
noun, the denotation of the quantified noun phrases JallK(A), JsomeK(A), and
JmostK(A) would correspond to the following generalized quantifiers:
JAllK(A) = {X ⊆ U : ∅ 6= A ⊆ X}
JsomeK(A) = {X ⊆ U : X ∩A 6= ∅}
JMostK(A) =
{
X ⊆ U : |A ∩X| >
∣∣A ∩X∣∣}
Whereas A is the property denoted by a noun, JDK(A) is the set of properties
(i.e., the generalized quantifier) denoted by a syntactic phrase whose head is the
determiner D.
Consider, for concreteness, the following quantified statements.
(1) a. All men run
b. Some men run
c. Most men run
Given a particular universe domain U that includes the set M of men and the
set R of runners, when we calculate the denotation of (1-a) we need to de-
termine whether R belongs to JallK(M); or in other words, we need to check
whether M ⊆ R. The proposed definition of all reflects the well-known existen-
tial presupposition of this determiner in natural languages: the statement all
men run presupposes that there is at least one man, i.e., that the set M is not
empty.1 Similarly, in order to determine the denotation of (1-b) we must find
out whether R ∩M 6= ∅. Finally, the sentence (1-c) will be true if and only if
1Cf., among others, section 6.7 of Heim and Kratzer (1997) for a detailed study of existential
presuppositions of quantificational expressions.
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the intersection of M and R is larger than the intersection of M and R (the
complementary set of R, i.e., the set of non-runners).
Within this basic framework, the set DU of possible determiner denotations
over an arbitrary U is the set of functions from properties over U to sets of
properties over U, i.e.,
DU = {f : f : P(U)→ P(P(U))} .
We emphasize that determiner denotations and generalized quantifiers are dif-
ferent semantic notions (Barwise and Cooper 1981, p. 161-162): a determiner
denotation is a function that takes properties as arguments and yields general-
ized quantifiers as values. Or equivalently, a determiner denotation is a member
of DU and a generalized quantifier a member of P(P(U)).
In principle, we could expect that, for any U and any conceivable function
belonging to DU , there would exist a natural language determiner conveying
such a function. If this were the case, natural language determiners would
realize all semantic possibilities, and consequently, one could argue, the class
of natural determiners would have a maximal expressive power: it would be as
rich as it would be semantically possible.
However, Barwise and Cooper (1981)’s investigations of how Montague’s treat-
ment of quantification can be further developed in order to obtain important
implications for a theory of natural languages suggested certain universals that
constrain the set of natural determiners.
In this article we shall be initially concerned with perhaps the most popular
universal that constrains the set of natural determiners: the so called Con-
servativity Constraint or Conservativity Universal (Keenan 1981, Keenan and
Stavi 1986).
(2) Conservativity Constraint (Keenan and Stavi 1986, p. 260)
Determiners in all languages are interpreted by conservative functions
As common, we shall understand that a determiner D is interpreted by a conser-
vative function (or more briefly, that a determiner denotation D is conservative)
when the following property is satisfied:
Definition 2. The conservativity property
For all universe domains U, all possible determiner denotations D, and all pairs
X, Y of subsets of U, D is conservative iff:
Y ∈ D(X)⇔ (X ∩ Y ) ∈ D(X).
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As is well known, the conservativity property has also been studied under the
name intersectivity by Higginbotham and May (1981) and was originally con-
ceived by Barwise and Cooper (1981) in terms of the “lives on” property, un-
derstood as follows:
Definition 3. The “lives on” property
For all universe domains U, all possible determiner denotations D, and all pairs
X, Y of subsets of U, the quantifier D(X) lives on X iff:
Y ∈ D(X)⇔ (X ∩ Y ) ∈ D(X).
From Definitions 2 and 3 it is immediately obvious that the conservativity prop-
erty relative to determiners and the “lives on” property relative to generalized
quantifiers are equivalent. We state this in the following basic theorem.
Theorem 1. For all U and all D, D is conservative iff, for all X, D(X) lives
on X.
The intuition behind the notions of conservativity and “lives on” is that in quan-
tified statements such as those in (1) the argument of the determiner, namely,
the set M, has a special status. M provides the restriction or the domain of
individuals relevant for the determiner. When we consider whether the function
denoted by the determiner holds between the domain provided by M and the set
R, M is conserved, i.e., it is preserved without being tampered with. It is in this
sense that we can say, following Keenan and Stavi (1986)’s terminology, that
a determiner is conservative with respect to its restriction, and that the deno-
tation of D(JNP K) (a quantifier, in Barwise and Cooper (1981)’s terminology),
lives on the set JNP K.
1.1 Basic illustrations
This subsection is mainly illustrative and attempts to be informative for those
readers who are not particularly familiarized with our topic of study.2 We shall
focus our attention on the class of cardinal numeral determiners JnK, such as one,
two, ..., in order to exemplify how the Conservativity Constraint bans certain
determiners that would be otherwise expected.
Let us define the quantifier JnK(A), for any property A over an arbitrary universe
domain U .
2We refer the interested reader to the following extensive survey works on the topic of
generalized quantifiers in linguistics and logic: Szabolcsi (2010), Keenan and Westerst̊ahl
(2010), Peters and Westerst̊ahl (2006), Keenan (1996) and Partee et al. (1990).
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Definition 4. For all universe domain U , all A ⊆ U and all natural number
n ≥ 1,
JnK(A) = {X ⊆ U : |X ∩A| ≥ n} .
Therefore the denotation JnK(A) would be the set of all those subsets of U whose
intersection with A has at least n elements. It is easy to see that:
Lemma 1. JnK-numerals are conservative functions.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary numeral JnK and let us check whether, for any two
subsets A, B of U, JnK satisfies the property of being conservative introduced in
Definition 2:
(3) B ∈ JnK(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ JnK(A).
If we now apply to (3) the general definition of JnK(A) provided in Definition 4,
we obtain the following biconditional:
(4) |A ∩B| ≥ n⇔ |A ∩ (A ∩B)| ≥ n.
Note that A ∩ A = A, since intersection is an idempotent operation, whereby
A ∩ B = A ∩ (A ∩ B). As a consequence, the biconditional (4) is necessarily
true, and thus the function JnK is conservative.
An instance of JnK-numeral is two; following Definition 4, the quantified noun
phrase two doctors would denote the following set:
Jtwo doctorsK = J2K(D) = {X ⊆ U : |X ∩D| ≥ 2} .
Accordingly, a sentence like two doctors speak French would be true iff the
intersection of the set D of doctors and the set F of French speakers contains
at least two members (|F ∩D| ≥ 2).
We can easily check that two is interpreted by a conservative function by fol-
lowing the reasoning developed above for an arbitrary JnK-numeral. The crucial
observation is that D ∩ X = D ∩ (D ∩ X); as a consequence, it has to be the
case that
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|D ∩X| ≥ 2⇔ |D ∩ (D ∩X)| ≥ 2,
which implies that JtwoK is conservative.
We can now continue by constructing a quantifier Jn̂K(A), for any property over
an arbitrary U .




X ⊆ U :
∣∣X ∩A∣∣ ≥ n} .
For n = 2, we obtain the J2̂K-numeral –call it owt– which denotes the set
J2̂K(A) =
{
X ⊆ U :
∣∣X ∩A∣∣ ≥ 2} .
In accordance with this definition, the sentence owt doctors speak French will
be true iff there are at least two individuals in the universe who are not doctors
and speak French.
Whereas JnK-numerals are pervasive in natural languages, Jn̂K-numerals are
plainly unattested. Nonetheless, both type of numerals seem to be logically
legitimate; as a matter of fact, the intended meaning of a synthetic Jn̂K-numeral
can be expressed by the combination of an JnK-numeral and a negative marker
non- prefixed to the noun.
(5) Two non-doctors speak French
But it is also true that JnK-numerals are conservative, as we have just shown,
whereas Jn̂K-numerals are non-conservative.3
3It is common to use not only in informal presentations but also in technical studies a
particular type of paraphrase to informally verify whether or not a determiner is conservative.
For instance, in order to decide whether two, some and all are conservative, whereas owt is
not, we can check whether the following biconditionals hold:
(i) a. Two doctors speak French ⇔ Two doctors are doctors that speak French
b. Some doctors speak French ⇔ Some doctors are doctors that speak French
c. All doctors speak French ⇔ All doctors are doctors that speak French
d. Owt doctors speak French ⇔ Owt doctors are doctors that speak French
In examples (i-a), (i-b) and (i-c), if the sentences in the left-hand of the biconditional are true,
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Lemma 2. Jn̂K-numerals are non-conservative functions.
Proof. We shall show that, for all A, B, the following biconditional does not
hold:
(6) B ∈ Jn̂K(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ Jn̂K(A).
Observe that the statement in the left-hand of the biconditional (6), ‘B ∈
Jn̂K(A)’, is a contingency: according to Definition 5 of Jn̂K-determiner, B be-
longs to Jn̂K(A) iff the intersection of A and B contains at least n elements. The
truth of this statement will depend on the particular model and the particular
universe. For instance, the statement owt doctors speak French is true given a
very realistic situation: we would only need to find at least two individuals who
are not doctors and speak French.
However, if we apply Definition 5 of Jn̂K(A) to the statement in the right-hand
of the biconditional (6), ‘A ∩B ∈ Jn̂K(A)’, we obtain the formula
(7)
∣∣(A ∩B) ∩A∣∣ ≥ n,
which is necessarily false. In order to see this, note that it is always the case that∣∣A ∩A∣∣ = 0. As a consequence, ∣∣(A ∩A) ∩B∣∣ = 0. And given that intersection
is a commutative operation,
∣∣(A ∩A) ∩B∣∣ = ∣∣(A ∩B) ∩A∣∣ = 0.
Therefore, the statement in (7) must be false, because Jn̂K-determiners –like JnK-
determiners– are defined for any natural number that is equal to or larger than 1
and
∣∣(A ∩B) ∩A∣∣ = 0. Since the sentences in the left-hand and the right-hand
of the biconditional (6) are, respectively, a contingency and a contradiction,
Jn̂K-numerals are non-conservative.
then the redundant sentences in the right-hand must also be true, and vice versa. Therefore,
their respective determiners are conservative. In example (i-d), the biconditional does not
hold, for the first sentence (which is equivalent to two non-doctors speak French) is a con-
tingency, whereas the second one (which is equivalent to two non-doctors are doctors that
speak French) is a contradiction. Since the sentences that appear in the left-hand and in the
right-hand of the biconditional symbol in examples (i) correspond, respectively, to D(A,B)
and D(A,A ∩B), this intuitive procedure is used to verify the conservativity property.
Here we articulate our arguments directly in set-theoretical terms, without resorting to
natural language paraphrases, in order to attain the appropriate level of generality; this allows
us to study not only particular determiners, such as some, all, two or owt, but crucially classes
of determiners, such as JnK-determiners and Jn̂K-determiners, among others.
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Hence, the Conservativity Constraints correctly predicts that there can be no
determiner in any natural language that conveys an Jn̂K-numeral.
1.2 Motivation for the Conservativity Constraint
Our previous illustrations, although far from being comprehensive, clearly sug-
gest that languages instantiate only a portion of all logically possible deter-
miners, and the Conservativity Constraint seems to have an important role in
restricting the class of natural determiners. As has been argued by Keenan
and Stavi (1986), the Conservativity Constraint is remarkably strong since it
bans most ways in which the set P(U) of properties over U (i.e., of NP denota-
tions) can be mapped into P(P(U)), the set of generalized quantifiers over U .
According to Proposition 4 of Keenan and Stavi (1986, p. 290),
In a model with n individuals there are 22
2n
functions from P(U)
into P(P(U)). Provably only 23n of which are conservative.
For instance, as Keenan and Stavi (1986, p. 290) observe, in a model with only
two individuals there are 22 = 4 properties, which means that there are 24 = 16
sets of properties. Accordingly, there are 216 = 65, 536 functions from P(U) into
P(P(U)). However, provably only 232 = 29 = 512 of these are conservative.
The Conservativity Constraint, Keenan and Stavi (1986, p. 291) note, “may
be interpreted in a way analogous to that in which linguists interpret syntactic
constraints: the language learner does not have to seek the meaning of a novel
determiner among all logically possible ways in which CNP denotations might
be associated with NP denotations. He only has to choose from among those
ways which satisfy conservativity”. Thus, inasmuch as a syntactic constraint
such as the Structure Dependence Principle (Chomsky 1972, Berwick et al.
2011) restricts the class of possible internal merge operations, the Conservativ-
ity Constraint would narrow down the set of linguistically possible determiner
denotations.
A further important question is why the possible determiner denotations of
natural languages would have to be precisely conservative functions. Keenan
and Stavi’s answer is that the Conservativity Constraint is a byproduct of the
boolean structure of language (cf. Keenan and Stavi 1986 as well as van Ben-
them 1983 for discussion). Following van Benthem’s (p. 453-455) simplification
of Keenan and Stavi’s algebraic account, we can define, for a finite universe U,
an initial class of basic conservative determiner functions, say inclusion (all)
and overlap (some). We can now apply to this set of basic determiners boolean
operations (the conjunction, the negation and the disjunction of more basic
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determiners). Then the set of determiner functions that are generated is pre-
cisely the set of conservative functions. In other words, “the set of conservative
determiners is closed under the boolean operations and contains certain basic
simple functions we need to interpret simple determiners (Keenan and Stavi
1986, p. 291).”
At this point we must cast doubt on this result for well-known empirical reasons
(see also section 5): in spite of the power of the Conservativity Constraint
in banning certain determiner functions, several instances of non-conservative
functions have been attested in natural languages. In section 2 we shall present
the case of only and the case of the relative proportional determiners many and
few, which are instances of linguistic categories that are interpreted by non-
conservative functions. In section 3 we shall present the Witness Set Constraint,
which is inspired in Barwise and Cooper (1981)’s considerations on the semantic
processing of quantified statements. We shall show how this constraint accounts
not only for the remarkable absence of certain non-conservative functions, such
as Jn̂K-numerals, but also for the presence of attested non-conservative functions
mentioned in section 2. In this sense, the Witness Set Constraint is more general
and empirically more accurate than the Conservativity Constraint.
2 Attested non-conservative functions
The best-known instance of non-conservative function denoted by a linguistic
item is provided by the linguistic category only, contained in the following sen-
tence:
(8) Only Athenians think
We shall consider that the statement (8) is true if the denotation of the predicate
think is included in the denotation of the NP Athenians. In other words, (8)
will be true if all the members of a given universe domain that think are also
Athenians. In set-theoretical terms, this means that (8) is true if the set T
of thinkers is included in the set A of Athenians. Moreover, (8) conveys that
effectively there are some individuals in the universe that have the property of
thinking, or in other words, that T is non-empty.4 We recast these two basic
4It is debatable whether the requirement that T is not empty is an entailment of only Athe-
nians think, or rather a presupposition or an implicature; cf. von Fintel (1997), and references
cited therein, for this controversial issue, as well as for a detailed study of the semantics of
only. Here we shall not be concerned with the pragmatic nature of this requirement and we
shall simply express it in Definition 6 as part of the definition of the set JonlyK(A). The inves-
tigation of how our Witness Set Constraint (see section 3) relates to pragmatic mechanisms
requires a much deeper consideration and is left for future research.
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observations in the following definition.
Definition 6. For all U and all A ⊆ U ,
JonlyK(A) = {X ⊆ U : ∅ 6= X ⊆ A} .
Accordingly the quantifier JonlyK(A) is equal to P(A) − ∅. As is well known,
only is not conservative.
Lemma 3. The function JonlyK is non-conservative.
Proof. For JonlyK to be conservative it should meet the following requirement
for all sets A, B :
(9) B ∈ JonlyK(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ JonlyK(A).
If we apply to (9) the simplified semantics of JonlyK(A) described in Definition
6, we obtain the following biconditional:
∅ 6= B ⊆ A⇔ ∅ 6= (A ∩B) ⊆ B.
The sentence in the right-hand of the biconditional is a set-theoretical truth:
for any two sets A, B, A ∩ B ⊆ B. But the truth of this statement does not
entail the truth of ∅ 6= B ⊆ A. Therefore, JonlyK is not conservative.
It is common to consider that the non-conservative nature of only is not a
problem for the Conservativity Constraint, since the syntactic distribution of
only suggests that it is not a determiner but rather an adverb “of some type” (cf.,
among others, van Benthem 1983, von Fintel 1997, von Fintel and Matthewson
2008). For instance, only differs from canonical determiners in that it “can
combine with pronouns or names”, it “can occur on top of other determiners”
and it can also “combine with categories other than noun phrases” (von Fintel
and Matthewson 2008, p. 163).
(10) a. Only John/they came late
b. Only two guests came late
c. John only stayed for a couple of minutes
Thus, according to this view, the Conservativity Constraint applies solely to
determiners; since only is not a determiner, it is not a counterexample to the
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Constraint. It is fair to note, though, that the paradigm in (10) does not
necessarily indicate that only is never a determiner: it could be that only is a
determiner in (8), but not in any of the uses listed in (10). The Conservativity
Constraint does not prohibit that an expression that denotes a function from
properties to quantifiers can have other uses, but requires these functions to be
conservative. Crucially, in the cases where only can be interpreted by a function
from properties to quantifiers, it should satisfy the Conservativity Constraint,
and it does not.
However, in our view, even if the Conservativity Constraint is restricted to
determiners and even if it were the case that only is never a determiner, the
non-conservativity of only poses an interesting and genuine problem for the
thesis that conservativity plays an important role in natural language semantics.
If it is true that there can be no determiners interpreted by non-conservative
functions, why is it that an alleged non-determiner can be interpreted by a
non-conservative function? If the class of determiners must be semantically
constrained in a particular way, why is it that the class of adverbs does not need
to meet such a requirement? If it is true that the Conservativity Constraint is a
byproduct of the boolean structure of language Keenan and Stavi (1986), should
we stipulate that the adverb only does not reflect this deep semantic property
whereas determiners must adhere to it?
Indeed, conservativity is a property of functions, and a priori functions may
be denoted by any type of linguistic categories regardless of their syntactic
behavior. Nothing in the notion of conservativity (see Definition 2) entails that
it should apply to restrict the set of possible denotations of those categories that
belong to the syntactic class of determiners, as the Conservativity Constraint in
(2) claims. For this reason, appealing to the syntactic behavior of only in order
to save the Conservativity Constraint seems far from providing a principled
understanding of the availability of a non-conservative function to interpret
sentences like (8).
There is a further observation that has forced researchers to question the Con-
servativity Constraint. It has been known since Westerst̊ahl (1985) that there
is a rather uncontroversial determiner, many, that casts doubt on the Conser-
vativity Constraint. Consider the so-called relative proportional interpretation
of many in sentence (11), produced by Westerst̊ahl.
(11) Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize in literature
Indeed, in 1984, by the time Westerst̊ahl considered sentence (11), there were
14 winners of the Nobel Prize in literature from Scandinavia out of a total
of 81. This situation makes sentence (11) true under a relative proportional
2 ATTESTED NON-CONSERVATIVE FUNCTIONS 12
interpretation of many.5
Westerst̊ahl’s account for the relative proportional reading of (11) was based on
the idea that the order of arguments of many is switched or reversed: although
many forms a constituent with the NP to the exclusion of the VP in syntax, at
the relevant level of semantic interpretation the VP and the NP would be respec-
tively the first and the second argument of many. Crucially, many would not
take its expected restriction, namely the set denoted by the NP Scandinavians,
but rather the set denoted by the VP have won the Nobel Prize in literature.
Accordingly, statement (11) would be equivalent to many of the winners of the
Nobel Prize in literature were Scandinavians (Cohen 2001, p. 42). In this sense,
the relative proportional reading of many in (11) would be non-conservative on
the set denoted by the NP, but rather on the set denoted by the VP (cf. also
Keenan 1986, 2002).6
This reverse interpretation of the relative proportional reading of many is fol-
lowed as well in Herburger (1997)’s proposal, according to which what triggers
the reverse order of arguments of many is the focalization of Scandinavians.
However, here we shall follow Cohen’s criticism of the reverse interpretation,
and thus we shall assume that in (11) the restriction of many is the NP Scan-
dinavians.
Let us thus adapt Cohen (2001)’s characterization of the relative proportional
interpretation of the determiner many. A part from the universe domain U
under consideration (say, for instance, the world population in 1984 or the
European population in 1984), we need to consider the following two basic sets
included in U :
1. the set S of Scandinavians, and
2. the set L of Nobel laureates in literature.
Intuitively, the statement in (11) is true “iff the proportion of Scandinavians
who won the Nobel Prize is greater than the proportion of Nobel laureates
5The relative proportional interpretation of many is different from other interpretations
that can be attributed to many: the so-called cardinal interpretation and proportional in-
terpretation (Partee 1988). Note, in this regard, that sentence (i) can mean either that the
number of customers that bought the new product is considered large, or that a large propor-
tion of customers bought the new product. In the former case we obtain a cardinal meaning
of many, whereas in the latter we obtain a proportional reading.
(i) Many customers bought the new product
6That many is not conservative (on its first argument) is supported by the observation that
sentence (11), under the reverse interpretation, is not equivalent to the sentence many that
are Scandinavian have won the Nobel Prize in literature and are Scandinavian. Cf. footnote
1 for this type of paraphrase.
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in literature in the world (or European) population as a whole (Cohen 2001,
p. 54)”. Formally, this means that in order to calculate the truth value of (11)

















We propose, in accordance with these considerations, the following general def-
inition of the quantifier JrpmanyK(A) for all property A:
Definition 7. For all universe U and all A ⊂ U ,
JrpmanyK(A) =
{







Observe that, according to this definition, the set A is a proper subset of U
and is not a subset of B. We shall motivate these restrictions in subsection 2.1.
Now we show that the function denoted by the relative proportional determiner
many is non-conservative.
Lemma 4. The determiner denotation JrpmanyK violates the Conservativity
Constraint.
Proof. Let the universe domain U = {a, b, c, d, e}, and consider its subsets A =
{a, b} and B = {b, c, d}. Then, |A ∩B| = |{b}| = 1, |A| = 2, |B| = 3 and
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Thus, B /∈ JrpmanyK(A). But one the other hand note that:












whereby A ∩B ∈ JrpmanyK(A). As a result, it is not true that
B ∈ JrpmanyK(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ JrpmanyK(A),
which means that JrpmanyK does not satisfy the Conservativity Constraint.
The determiner few can also have a relative proportional reading. The quantifier
JrpfewK(A) can be described analogously to Definition 7:
Definition 8. For all universe U and all A ⊂ U ,
JrpfewK(A) =
{







Lemma 5. The determiner denotation JrpfewK violates the Conservativity
Constraint.
Proof. Let U = {a, b, c, d} and consider A = {b, c, d} and B = {a, b}. Then,
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Thus, B ∈ JfewK(A). But on the other hand note that












whereby A ∩B /∈ JfewK(A). As a result, it is not true that
B ∈ JfewK(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ JfewK(A),
which means that the determiner denotation JrpfewK is a counterexample to
the Conservativity Constraint.
2.1 On the availability of relative proportional readings
The definitions above given for the relative proportional quantifiers incorporate
two natural constraints: the restriction A of a relative proportional quantifier
cannot be identical to the universe domain and cannot be included in the set B
denoted by the predicate. These constraints are introduced in order to account
for the unavailability of relative proportional readings in certain cases. We shall
discuss them in turn in the following two remarks.
Remark 1. The relative proportional readings of statements of the form [[many
A] B] and [[few A] B] are not available when A = U .
Consider the following reasoning in order to perceive that the relative propor-
tional interpretations are not available when the universe is the restriction.
Assume that U is the human population in 2014. Then, the set denoted by the
noun humans in (14) is identical to the universe we are considering. In this
case, the relative proportional readings of the following two sentences are not
available.
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(14) a. Many humans live in China
b. Few humans live in Greenland
We shall test the unavailability of the relative proportional readings of the sen-
tences in (14). Assume, contrary to what Definitions 7 and 8 state, that U can
be the restriction of the determiners JrpmanyK and JrpfewK. Then, B would
























This means that inequalities (15) and (16) are false, and thus B belongs neither
to JrpmanyK(U) nor to JrpmanyK(U).
But these truth conditions do not seem to reflect our semantic intuitions about
the sentences in (14): our linguistic competence does not allow us to interpret
the sentences (14-a) and (14-b) as contradictions. This clearly indicates that
many and few are not interpreted as relative proportional determiners in (14-a)
and (14-b).
Expressions (14-a) and (14-b) admit, for instance, a cardinal reading, according
to which they are interpreted as contingencies. Given the present distribution
of human populations, statement (14-a) will be true because the cardinality of
the intersection of U and the set C of humans living in China may be consid-
ered a ‘large natural number’: more than 1,300,000,000 people live in China
out of 7,000,000,000 people, the (approximate) total world population in 2014.
Analogously, (14-b) will be true because approximately 55,000 people live in
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Greenland, a figure that may be regarded as small.7
Remark 2. The relative proportional readings of statements of the form [many
A] B] and [few A] B] are not available when A ⊆ B.
We shall test the unavailability of relative proportional interpretations firstly
when A = B and secondly when A ⊂ B.
1. A = B. Consider the following sentences, where both the NP and the VP
denote the set L of linguists.
(18) a. Many linguists are linguists
b. Few linguists are linguists
Assume, contrary to Definition 7 of JrpmanyK(A), that A = B. Recall
that, from Remark 1, A is a proper subset of U . Consider the case where







But note that A would not belong to JrpmanyK(A) when A = ∅. In fact,







because |U | · 0 = 0 · 0.
Accordingly, the sentence many linguists are linguists should be true iff
the universe domain contains at least one linguist (L 6= ∅) and at least
one non-linguist (L ⊂ U), no matter the exact cardinalities of U and A.
If U had billions of individuals, and solely one of them were a linguist,
then sentence (18-a) should be a true statement; if U contained just two
individuals and one of them were a linguist, then (18-a) should still be true.
Given that these truth conditions do not reflect our semantic intuitions
about sentence (18-a), we must conclude that many is not interpreted as
a relative proportional determiner when A = B.
Assume, contrary to Definition 8 of JrpfewK(A), that A = B. Then,
statement (18-b) would necessarily be false under a relative proportional
reading: A could never belong to JrpfewK(A), since inequality (19) is
always false.
7What counts as a small or large number is of course vague and seems to be dependent on
context (Westerst̊ahl 1985, Lappin 1988, 1993), but also on the intensions of the NP and the
VP denotations (Keenan and Faltz 1985, Fernando and Kamp 1996, Lappin 2000).








Let A 6= ∅. Observe that |A∩A||A| = 1 and also that
|A|
|U | < 1, because A ⊂ U
from Remark 1. In this case, |A∩A||A| >
|A|
|U | .








which, as argued above, is false, because |U | · 0 = 0 · 0.
Therefore, the inequality (19) will necessarily be false, and thus A would
never belong to JrpfewK(A).
Accordingly, sentence (18-b) should be false no matter the proportion of
linguists in the universe domain: it would be false if there are two linguist
in a universe with millions of individuals. Since sentence (18-b) is not
readily interpreted according to these truth conditions, we must conclude
that few cannot be interpreted as a relative proportional determiner when
A = B. This is ensured by the proposed Definition 8 of JrpmanyK(A).
2. A ⊂ B. Consider the following sentences, where the predicate denotation
properly includes the NP denotation.
(21) a. Many Italians are European
b. Few Italians are European
We shall first focus our attention on many. Assume, contrary to Definition









Let us inspect when (22) is true. On one hand, given that A ⊂ B, A∩B =
A; as a result, |A∩B||A| =
|A|
|A| , which is equal to 1 iff A 6= ∅. On the other
hand, |B||U | < 1 iff B 6= U . Thus, (22) is true iff A 6= ∅ and B 6= U .
Therefore, sentence (21-a) should be true iff the set of Italians is not empty
and the set of Europeans is properly included in the universe domain; or
in other words, statement (21-a) should be equivalent to in the universe
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domain there is at least one Italian and at least one non-European. These
truth conditions, though, are not supported by our semantic intuitions
concerning (21-a). This reveals that (21-a) cannot receive a relative pro-
portional interpretation.








This inequality, though, is necessarily false. Given that, by assumption,
A ⊂ B, if A 6= ∅, then the left-hand fraction |A∩B||A| is equal to 1. But of
course, the right-hand fraction |B||U | cannot be larger to 1: it will be smaller




|U | , because |U | · 0 = 0 · |B|.
Therefore, statement (21-b) should be a contradiction. But again it seems
that that the truth conditions we have just described no not correspond
to the expression (21-b).
In the remainder of this article we shall argue for the Witness Set Constraint, an
alternative to the Conservativity Constraint just reviewed, in order to account
not only for the observation that certain non-conservative functions are not
expressed by natural language determiners, but also for the non-conservativity
of only and the relative proportional determiners many and few.
3 The Witness Set Constraint
In reading Barwise and Cooper (1981) it is clear that these authors were not
concerned with deriving the property “lives on” (see above Definition 3) from
deeper principles. They defined this property, which had gone unnoticed by se-
manticists, claimed that they were not aware of any natural language determiner
that did not map a common noun denotation A to a quantifier that did not live
on A, and assumed the property in order to define certain linguistic universals
and demonstrate relevant propositions of their theory. The authors observed as
well that the property is used in order to prove quantified statements such as
(24), where the determiner more than half applies to an infinite set, the set of
integers.
(24) More than half of the integers are not prime
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The truth of this statement is not dependent “on an a priori logic”, Barwise
and Cooper note, but rather on “which underlying measure of infinite sets one
is using” (Barwise and Cooper 1981, p. 163). This measure may live on different
infinite sets: if the chosen metrics lives on the set of prime number, then the
statement is false, but “more common measures which do not give special weight
to primes will make [(24)] true” (Barwise and Cooper 1981, footnote 3).
What is more relevant to our concerns is that the “lives on” property (or equiv-
alently, the conservativity property) may be related to the semantic processing
of quantified statements. Let us focus our attention on this issue.
Barwise and Cooper mentioned an objection that could be leveled against Mon-
tague’s treatment of NP’s: in order to check the truth of a sentence like John
runs, “we need to calculate the denotation of [John]NP , namely, the family of all
sets X to which John belongs, and then see if the set of runners is one of these
sets”. This procedure for checking the truth of a simple sentence containing a
proper noun seems “well nigh impossible”, and “clearly corresponds in no way
to the reasoning process actually used by a native speaker of English (Barwise
and Cooper 1981, p. 191)”. As a consequence, they suggest an intuitive check-
ing procedure for simple NPs, which can be applied in general to quantified
expressions, based on the notion of witness set. This notion incorporated the
property of “lives on” in the following way (Barwise and Cooper 1981, p. 191):8
(25) Witness set (preliminary definition)
A witness set for a quantifier D(A) living on A is any subset w of A
such that w ∈ D(A).
The only witness set for JJohnK is the singleton {John}. A witness set for
Ja doctorK and for Jmost doctorsK are, respectively, any non-empty subset of
doctors and any subset of doctors that contains most doctors. And the only
witness set for Jno doctorK is ∅.
The notion of witness set simplifies the semantic processing of quantified state-
ments by reducing the sets to be considered. In order to perceive this obser-
vation, note, for instance, that the set of presidents, the set of men and the
set of pianists would all belong to the generalized quantifier Ja doctorK, for the
8Cf. Szabolcsi (2010) and Szabolcsi (1997) for an introduction to the notion of witness set,
as well as Beghelli et al. (1997) for an application of this notion to the study of scope ambigu-
ities. It is worth noting that witness sets play a crucial role in some recent investigations on
natural language quantification, especially in the study of collective and cumulative readings
of quantified sentences in natural languages (cf. Robaldo 2011, Robaldo 2013, Robaldo and
Szymanik 2012, Robaldo et al. 2014). Particularly, Robaldo (2013) studies the role of con-
servativity in relation to these interpretations and argues that it serves to maximize witness
sets for quantifiers; conservativity is thus important to ensure correct truth conditions of some
interpretations.
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intersection of any of those three sets with the set of doctors is non-empty: we
may be able to find a president, a man or a pianist who is also a doctor. How-
ever, none of those sets would be a witness set for the generalized quantifier
Ja doctorK, because none of them satisfies the condition of being a subset of the
set of doctors, contrary to what the definition of witness set requires; indeed, in
a very realistic situation, we may be able to find a president, a man and a pianist
who is not a doctor. Consequently, those three sets would be irrelevant when,
for instance, the statement a doctor speaks French is semantically processed.
We can now decide whether B belongs to the quantifier D(A) living on A by
following the procedure in (26), which examines whether there exists a witness
set w for D(A) with certain properties (Barwise and Cooper 1981, Szabolcsi
1997).
(26) Let W [D(A)] be the set of witness sets for a quantifier D(A) living on A.
a. If D(A) is monotone increasing, i.e.,
(∀X,Y ) ((X ∈ D(A) ∧X ⊆ Y )⇒ Y ∈ D(A)),
then check whether (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ w ⊆ B).
b. If D(A) is monotone decreasing, i.e.,
(∀X,Y ) ((X ∈ D(A) ∧ Y ⊆ X)⇒ Y ∈ D(A)),
then check whether (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w).
c. If D(A) is non-monotonic, i.e., it is neither increasing nor decreas-
ing, then check whether (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).
d. If there is such a w, then we conclude that B ∈ D(A); otherwise,
we conclude that B /∈ D(A).
Accordingly, in order to determine whether a doctor speaks French is true in a
particular model we would need to find firstly a witness set w for Ja doctorK,
i.e., a non-empty subset of the set D of doctors that, according to the model
under consideration, belongs to Ja doctorK. Assume for instance that w =
{Marie,David}, i.e., assume that Marie and David belong to D and that w
belongs to the quantifier Ja doctorK. Secondly, we should determine whether
this quantifier is monotone increasing, monotone decreasing or non-monotonic;
as is well known, it is monotone increasing (observe for instance that the set F
of French speakers is included in the set of speakers of Romance languages and
that the sentence a doctor speaks French entails the sentence a doctor speaks
a Romance language). Thirdly, we would need to follow step (26-a) and check
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whether w is included in F, i.e., whether Marie and Peter, which belong to D,
belong to F as well.
The introduction of the “lives on” property into the definition of witness set was
quite natural in Barwise and Cooper (1981), especially because they had previ-
ously claimed that they knew “of no counterexamples in the world’s languages
to the following requirement”:
U3. Determiner Universal (Barwise and Cooper 1981, p. 177)
Every natural language contains basic expressions (called determin-
ers) whose semantic function is to assign to common noun denota-
tions (i.e., sets) A a quantifier that lives on A.9
However, as we shall see, it is not necessary to bring the “lives on” property (or
equivalently, the conservativity property) into the definition of witness set, and
indeed it is desirable to define the concept of witness set without appealing to
it, in the following way:
Definition 9. Witness set (final definition)
For all U and all A ⊆ U , a set w is a witness set for a generalized quantifier
D(A) iff w is a subset of A such that w ∈ D(A).
Henceforth, W [D(A)] will be the set of witness sets for a given quantifier D(A)
defined according to Definition 9.
As we shall argue in detail, this modification of the concept of witness set will
allow us to predict:
1. the existence of conservative determiners,
2. the non-existence of certain non-conservative determiners (such as Jn̂K-
numerals, cardinal comparative determiners and the converses of propor-
tionality determiners), and most importantly,
3. the existence of linguistic categories that express non-conservative func-
tions (such as only or the determiners many and few in their relative
proportional readings).
9Note that, the way it is formulated, Barwise and Coopers’s U3 allows for a reading that
makes it weaker than Keenan and Stavi’s Conservativity Constraint. Under that reading, U3
claims that all natural languages have quantifiers that live on its restriction (or equivalently,
conservative determiners), whereas the Conservativity Constraint claims that all determin-
ers of natural languages are conservative. Hence, under this reading, U3 is not falsified by
the existence of non-conservative determiners in natural languages. However, it may well
be that Barwise and Cooper’s intention was that it should be falsified by the existence of
non-conservative determiners as suggested by the use of the parentheses around “called deter-
miners”. According to this reading, U3 and the Conservativity Constraint would be equivalent.
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Thus, if we do not restrict the notion of witness set to quantifiers that live on, we
can understand why certain non-conservative functions are attested in natural
languages whereas other non-conservative functions are banned.
This will lead us to a new understanding of conservativity. It is not a primitive
principle of natural language semantics, but rather a byproduct of a truth cal-
culation constraint that requires appropriate witness sets in order to develop a
simpler model for how quantified statements are interpreted following procedure
(26). If this is correct, it is not the Conservativity Constraint that dictates what
functions from properties to quantifiers can be expressed by natural language
determiners, but rather what we shall call the Witness Set Constraint:
(27) Witness set Constraint
For all U, if a function D ∈ DU is expressed by a linguistic category,
then, for all A,B ⊆ U :
a. if D(A) is monotone increasing, then, B ∈ D(A) ⇔ (∃w) (w ∈
W [D(A)] ∧ w ⊆ B)
b. if D(A) is monotone decreasing, then B ∈ D(A) ⇔ (∃w) (w ∈
W [D(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w)
c. if D(A) is non-monotonic, then B ∈ D(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)]∧
(A ∩B) = w)
This constraint does not simply claim that a function D ∈ DU can be expressed
by a linguistic category if, for any subset A of a universe, D(A) has witness
sets. In fact, in section 4 we shall encounter many determiner denotations that
yield quantifiers that do have witness sets and nonetheless are not permitted by
the Witness Set Constraint. Crucially, the Witness Set Constraint appeals to
an appropriateness requirement : it requires D functions conveyed by linguistic
categories to yield quantifiers that have witness sets that are appropriate for the
procedure in (26) to calculate the truth of quantified statements. For instance
if (i) a quantifier D(A) is monotone increasing, (ii) B does not belong to D(A),
and (iii) there is some witness set for D(A) included in B, then the determiner D
is not a permissible denotation for a linguistic category according to the Witness
Set Constraint. In this case, conditional (27-a) is false, because its antecedent
is true (D(A) is monotone increasing) and its subsequent (a biconditional) is
false; W [D(A)] is not empty, but none of its elements is an appropriate witness
set.
This appropriateness requirement seems a conceptual necessity: if D yields gen-
eralized quantifiers that have witness sets that cannot be used to calculate effec-
tively the truth of a quantified statement following (26-a), (26-b) or (26-c), then
D should be banned. This requirement, which is crucial to test the adequacy of
our proposals, will be discussed in detail in section 4.
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The approach we are about to develop provides us with a particularly inter-
esting result: we can now account for the presence of certain categories that
express functions that are non-conservative with no further stipulation. It will
be immaterial for our concerns whether only is a determiner or an adverb from
a syntactic point of view, or whether certain determiners are conservative on
their first argument, whereas others are conservative on their second argument
(Keenan 1996, 2002). A function D from P(U) to P(P(U)) can be conveyed
by a linguistic category only if all the quantifiers that it yields as output have
appropriate witness sets, thereby permitting the procedure (26) to semantically
compute quantified statements on the basis of monotonicity properties.
3.1 All conservative functions satisfy the Witness Set Con-
straint
An initial attractive consequence of our proposal is that it acknowledges a causal
relationship between the conservativity property and the appropriateness re-
quirement of the Witness Set Constraint, as expressed in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. For all U and all D ∈ DU , if D is conservative, then, for all
A ⊆ U , if D(A) 6= ∅, it has appropriate witness sets.
Proof. Let D be conservative. Assume that A ⊆ U and also that D(A) 6= ∅.
This means that there is some set B that belongs to D(A). Given that, by
assumption, D is conservative and B ∈ D(A), then A ∩ B ∈ D(A). But it is a
set-theoretical truth that A∩B ⊆ A. Therefore, D(A) has a witness set, namely
A ∩B.
Thus, all conservative functions have witness sets. We shall now investigate
whether all conservative functions have appropriate witness sets, i.e., we shall
investigate whether all conservative functions satisfy conditionals (27-a), (27-b)
and (27-c) of the Witness Set Constraint.
Let D be conservative and the quantifier D(A) monotone increasing. Then we
need to verify whether the following biconditional is true for all sets A, B (cf.
(27-a)):
(28)
B ∈ D(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ w ⊆ B).
Assume the left-hand of (28); then, as we just argued, since D is conservative,
A∩B is a witness set for D(A). This implies the truth of the right-hand of (28),
for the witness set A ∩B is included in B. Assume now the right-hand of (28):
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there is a witness set w for D(A) –i.e., a subset of A that belongs to D(A)– that
is included in B. Given that D(A) is monotone increasing, the existence of a
set included in B that belongs to D(A) entails the left-hand of (28).
Let D be conservative and the quantifier D(A) monotone decreasing. Then we
need to check whether the following biconditional holds for all A, B (cf. (27-b)):
(29)
B ∈ D(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w).
Assume the left-hand of (29); then, since D is conservative, the subset A∩B of
A belongs to D(A), in which case A∩B is a witness set for D(A). Accordingly,
the right-hand of (29) is implied. Assume now the right-hand of (29): there is
a set w that belongs to D(A) and includes A ∩ B. The premise that D(A) is
monotone decreasing entails that the subset A ∩ B of w belongs to D(A): if
w belongs to D(A) and D(A) is monotone decreasing, then the subset A ∩ B
of w also belongs to D(A). And finally, if A ∩ B belongs to D(A), as we have
just concluded, then B belongs to D(A) as well, because, by assumption, D is
conservative.
Let D be conservative and the quantifier D(A) non-monotonic. Then we need
to demonstrate that the following biconditional is true for all A, B (cf. (27-c)):
(30)
B ∈ D(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).
The left-hand of (30) entails that A ∩ B is a witness set for D(A); thus the
right-hand of (30) is true as well. Assume now the right-hand of (30): the
subset A ∩ B of A belongs to D(A); this, along with the premise that D(A) is
conservative, implies the left-hand of (30).
Therefore, all conservative determiners have appropriate witness sets.
Note that, for any D ∈ DU , D(A) is often empty. Consider, for instance, the
set P denoted by the noun phrase planets of the Solar System; assume |P | = 8.
The quantifier denoted by the quantifier phrase exactly ten planets of the Solar
System would be the following, using Barwise and Cooper (1981) notation:
J10!K(P ) = {X ⊂ U : |P ∩X| = 10} .
In this model, there is no property X whose intersection with P has exactly
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ten elements, because the cardinality of P is eight. In general, for any natural
number n, the quantifier Jn!K(A) is empty when |A| < n. We must introduce the
following lemma concerning empty quantifiers and our Witness Set Constraint.
Lemma 6. Empty generalized quantifiers lack witness sets and are compatible
with the appropriate requirements of the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. Let D(A) = ∅. Then, there is no B ⊆ U such that B ∈ D(A). Con-
sequently, D(A) lacks witness sets, in which case there is no witness set w for
D(A) such that (a) w ⊆ B, (b) (B∩A) ⊆ w or (c) (B∩A) = w. This means that
the biconditionals in (27-a), (27-b) and (27-c) of the Witness Set Constraint are
true, because their respective left-hand statements and right-hand statements
are false.
We shall continue by illustrating that JnK-numerals satisfy the Witness Set Con-
straint. This is of course a consequence of Lemma 1 and Theorem 2: given that
JnK-numerals are conservative and all conservative functions have appropriate
witness sets, JnK-numerals have appropriate witness sets; therefore, they can be
conveyed by natural language categories (such as determiners). Secondly, we
shall demonstrate that inner negations, which are non-conservative, lack witness
sets; they are thus banned as denotations of linguistic categories by the Witness
Set Constraint.
Remark 3. JnK-numerals satisfy the Witness Set Constraint.
A witness set for JnK(A) is, by Definition 9 of witness set, any subset of A that
belongs to JnK(A). In other words, X is a witness set for JnK(A) iff X ⊆ A and,
by Definition (6) of JnK(A), |X ∩A| ≥ n. This is the set of witness sets for
JnK(A):
W [JnK(A)] = {X ⊆ A : |X ∩A| ≥ n} .
This means, simply, that any subset of A that contains at least n elements will
be a witness set for JnK(A). But we expect from Theorem 2 that D(A) has
appropriate witness sets to calculate the truth of quantified statements on the
basis of monotonicity properties, for D is conservative. In this regard, note that,
for any A ⊆ U , the quantifier JnK(A) is increasing monotonic, since
(∀X,Y )((X ∈ JnK(A) ∧X ⊆ Y )⇒ Y ∈ JnK(A)).
Thus, according to the Witness Set Constraint (27), a witness set w for JnK(A)
is appropriate iff the following biconditional holds (cf. (27-a)):
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B ∈ JnK(A)⇔ w ⊆ B.
Assume that B ∈ JnK(A). Then, by the definition of JnK(A), |A ∩B| ≥ n. In
this case, A ∩ B ∈ JnK(A) and, moreover, A ∩ B ⊆ A. Therefore, A ∩ B is a
witness set for JnK(A), which, in addition, is included in B. Thus, the truth of
the left-hand of the biconditional entails the truth of its right-hand.
Assume now that there is a witness set w for JnK(A) that is included in B.
Given that, by assumption, w is included in A and has at least n elements,
and w is also included in B, then |B ∩A| ≥ n. This entails that B ∈ JnK(A).
Accordingly, the truth of the right-hand of the biconditional implies the truth
of its left-hand. Therefore, JnK-numerals satisfies the Witness Set Constraint,
as expected from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2.
Consider, for concreteness, the JnK-determiner two. In order to find out, using
the procedure in (26), whether the statement two doctors speak French is true,
i.e., whether F ∈ JtwoK(D), we need to follow three steps. Firstly, we must find
a witness set w for JtwoK(D); assume that w = {Pierre, John, Marie}. Secondly,
we must determine whether JtwoK(D) is monotone increasing, a monotone de-
creasing, or non-monotonic; as noted, it is monotone increasing. Finally, given
that it is monotone increasing, we must follow the step indicated in (26-a), and
check whether w = {Pierre, John, Marie} is included in F. Only if this is the
case can we conclude that F ∈ JtwoK(F ).
Consider now Jn̂K-determiners. We shall see that they are not permitted by the
Witness Set Constraint because, for all subsets A of U , the quantifier Jn̂K(A)
does not have a witness set.
Lemma 7. For all U and all A ⊆ U , the generalized quantifier Jn̂K(A) has
no witness set, whereby the function Jn̂K cannot be expressed by any linguistic
category.
Proof. Recall that, for an arbitrary set X ⊆ U , X belongs to Jn̂K(A) iff
∣∣X ∩A∣∣ ≥
n. Note, though, that for any Jn̂K-determiner, X ∩A must be non-empty, since
Jn̂K-determiners are defined for any natural number n that is equal or larger to
1. Consequently, if X belongs to Jn̂K(A), then it has some elements that are not
elements of A (because they are elements of A), whereby X cannot be included
in A. This leads us to the situation where
X ∈ Jn̂K(A) iff X * A,
which implies that there is no witness set for Jn̂K(A).
3 THE WITNESS SET CONSTRAINT 28
The reasoning just developed for Jn̂K-determiners, can also be applied to ac-
count for the absence in the world’s languages of a further non-conservative de-
terminer, the allnon determiner discussed by (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet
2000, p. 426-427):
Definition 10. For all U and all A ⊆ U ,
allnon(A) = {X ⊆ U : (U −A) ⊆ X} .
According to this definition, the following sentence would state that all the
individuals of the universe U under consideration that belong to the set D of
doctors also belong to the set F of French speakers.
(31) Allnon doctors speak French
Lemma 8. For all U and all A ⊆ U , the generalized quantifier JallnonK(A) has
no witness set, whereby the function JallnonK violate the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. According to Definition 10, a set X belongs to JallnonK(A) iff (U −A) ⊆
X. Therefore, X belongs to JallnonK(A) iff X contains all the elements of the
universe except those contained in A, in which case X is not included in A. This
means that
X ∈ JallnonK(A)⇔ X * A.
Therefore, there can be no witness set for JallnonK(A).
As for statement (31) particularly, note that, whereas D contains all doctors of
U , JallnonK(D) contains all sets whose members are not doctors. For this reason,
there can be no set w that is both included in D and belong to JallnonK(D),
whereby there is no witness set for JallnonK(D).
Given the Witness Set Constraint, the functions Jn̂K and JallnonK are not le-
gitimate denotations for linguistic categories. Observe, in this regard, that the
quantifiers Jn̂K(A) and JallnonK(A) are monotone increasing. For instance, the
sentence owt doctors arrived late (i.e., “two individuals who are not doctors ar-
rived late”) entails the sentence owt doctors arrived (“two individuals who are
not doctors arrived”), but not the other way around. And similarly, allnon doc-
tors arrived late entails the sentence allnon doctors arrived, but not the other
way around.
However, since these inner negations lack witness sets, we cannot find, for all
A ⊆ U , a witness set w such that, respectively:
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w ⊆ A ∧ w ∈ JnK(A)
w ⊆ A ∧ w ∈ JallnonK(A).
The step described in (26-a) to calculate the truth conditions of this class of
quantified statements yields no output: it cannot calculate whether w ⊆ A be-
cause there is no witness set w. If witness sets are required, following Barwise
and Cooper’s insights, in order to provide a more feasible model for the compu-
tation of statements that contain generalized quantifiers, then the unavailability
of witness sets for inner negations may be the source of the non-existence of this
type of determiner.
Importantly, the converse to Theorem 2 fails, which is crucial for our proposal:
there are certain functions denoted by linguistic categories that satisfy the Wit-
ness Set Constraint but violate the Conservativity Constraint.
3.2 Non-conservative denotations of linguistic categories
satisfy the Witness Set Constraint
The non-attested inner negations studied above can be banned by both the
Conservativity Constraint and the Witness Set Constraint. With the aim of
defending that the latter is empirically more adequate than the former we shall
show that certain well-attested non-conservative functions expressed by linguis-
tic categories, namely JonlyK, JrpmanyK and JrpfewK, do satisfy the Witness
Set Constraint. This will strongly suggest that the Witness Set Constraint is a
more likely candidate for a universal principle that constrains the set of functions
from P(U) to P(P(U)) that are expressed by linguistic items.
Lemma 9. The function JonlyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. From Definition 6 of JonlyK(A), B belongs to JonlyK(A) iff it is a non-
empty subset of A. Consequently, the set of witness sets for JonlyK(A) is equal
to the quantifier JonlyK(A):
W [JonlyK(A)] = JonlyK(A) = P(A)− ∅.
Observe that JonlyK(A) is non-monotonic. It is not monotone increasing, be-
cause the truth of B ⊆ A does not entail the truth of C ⊆ A, for any set C such
that B ⊆ C. It is neither monotone decreasing because ∅ /∈ JonlyK(A).
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Thus, JonlyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint iff the following biconditional
holds for all for all A,B ⊆ U (cf. (27-c)):
(32)
B ∈ JonlyK(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [JonlyK(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).
If we apply Definition 6 of JonlyK(A) to the left-hand of (32) and we take w = B,
we obtain the following statement:
(33)
∅ 6= A ⊆ B ⇔ (B ∩A) = B,
which is a set-theoretical truth relative to the properties of intersection and
inclusion. Therefore, the function JonlyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint.
Let us illustrate the behavior of only in relation to the Witness Set Constraint.
Consider the three sets A = {a, b, c, e}, B = {b, c} and C = {d}. Observe that
A ∩ B = {b, c} = B, whereas A ∩ C = ∅ 6= C. This correctly predicts that B,
unlike C, belongs to the quantifier JonlyK(A).
More particularly, we semantically process a statement such as only Athenians
think by checking whether the intersection of the non-empty set T of thinkers
and the set A of Athenians is equal to T , following procedure (26). Only if this
is the case will the statement under consideration be true.
Let us turn our attention to the non-conservative determiner denotations JrpmanyK
and JrpfewK. We shall show that they satisfy the Witness Set Constraint.
Lemma 10. The function JrpmanyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. Let JrpmanyK(A) 6= ∅. Then, by Definition 7, there is some set B such








Note that A∩B = A∩(A∩B). Thus, multiplying out, we see that the inequality
(34) is equivalent to the following inequality:
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(35)






Hence, B ∈ JrpmanyK(A) iff A∩B ∈ JrpmanyK(A); furthermore, it is necessary
the case that A ∩ B is included in A, for the intersection of two arbitrary sets
is included in both sets, whereby A ∩B is a witness set for JrpmanyK(A).
The generalized quantifier JrpmanyK(A) is non-monotonic. Consider, in this
regard, statement (11). We can see that JrpmanyK(S) is not monotone increas-
ing because many Scandinavians won the Nobel Prize in Literature does not
entail Many Scandinavians have won the Nobel Prize, and it is not monotone
decreasing because the latter statement neither entails the former.
Consequently, the function JrpmanyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint iff,
for all A, B (cf. (27-c)):
B ∈ JrpmanyK(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [JrpmanyK(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).
But as we have just argued, B belongs to JrpmanyK(A) iff the subset A∩B of A
belongs to JrpmanyK(A), in which case A∩B is a witness set for JrpmanyK(A).
Therefore, JrpmanyK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint.
Lemma 11. The function JrpfewK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. This proof is analogous to the previous one. Note that JrpfewK(A) is
non-monotonic. Accordingly, JrpfewK satisfies the Witness Set Constraint iff,
for all A, B (cf. (27-c)):
B ∈ JrpfewK(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [JrpfewK(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).







Multiplying out, we see that A∩(A∩B) ∈ JrpfewK(A), in which case the subset
A ∩ B of A belongs to JrpfewK(A). Therefore, B ∈ JrpfewK(A) iff A ∩ B is a
witness set for JrpfewK(A).
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3.3 Universe Independence
Natural language determiners are mostly universe independent. Roughly, a
determiner is universe independent when its behavior does not change when the
universe is extended. For instance, the determiner two is universe independent
because, if two doctors speak French is true in a given model, then adding more
elements to the universe domain will not modify the truth of this statement.
The condition of Universe Independence, formally defined below, is also called
Extension and Constancy.
Definition 11. Universe Independence
A determiner denotation D is universe independent iff:
A,B ⊆ U ⊆ U ′ ⇒ (B ∈ DU (A)⇔ B ∈ DU ′(A)).
In Definition 11 we introduce subindexes in order to show that the universe
domain with respect to which the quantifier is calculated varies. Throughout,
when we suppress the parameter U , the universe is assumed to be constant.
We bring this property into consideration in order to observe that the non-
conservative determiners JrpmanyK and JrpfewK are universe dependent.
Lemma 12. The functions JrpmanyK and JrpfewK are universe dependent.













Accordingly, B /∈ JrpmanyU K(A), whereas B ∈ JrpfewU K(A). However, if we
add 10 elements to U in order to obtain a new universe domain U ′, then we













in which case B ∈ JrpmanyU ′K(A), whereas B /∈ JrpfewU ′K(A).
This is not an idiosyncratic property of JrpmanyK and JrpfewK (cf. Partee
et al. (1990) and Westerst̊ahl (1985)). In this regard, we must observe that
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non-trivial proportionality determiners such as more than half are also universe
dependent. For instance, more than half of students failed will be true if 25
students failed and the universe is a particular class of 40 students. However, the
same statement will be false if 25 students failed and the universe domain is the
larger class of 100 students of the entire school. In subsection 4.3 we shall study
non-trivial proportionality determiners, as well as their respective converses,
which provide an interesting case study for the Witness Set Constraint.
4 On the absence of appropriate witness sets
In this section we shall investigate some mathematical functions that are not
conveyed by linguistic categories. The unavailability of these functions as de-
notations of natural language determiners is commonly accounted for by means
of the Conservativity Constraint, since, as we shall indicate, they do not satisfy
such a constraint. These case studies are particularly interesting to test our
formulation of the Witness Set Constraint: although some of these functions
yield quantifiers that have no witness set at all (just like inner negations), there
are some cases which do have witness sets; nonetheless, their witness sets are
not appropriate, since they cannot be used to calculate the truth of the quanti-
fied statements that contain them (unlike relative proportional quantifiers). As
a result, we can derive their absence in natural language semantics from the
proposed Witness Set Constraint.
4.1 Quantifiers in which the truth of B ∈ D(A) depends
on B − A
Recall that the crucial intuition behind the Conservativity Constraint is that
we can evaluate the truth of B ∈ D(A) only on the basis of elements of A
–the restriction–, without considering the elements of B or any other sets. It is
only the restriction of D that provides the domain of individuals relevant for D.
Consider now the following quantifier:
Definition 12. For any universe domain U and any A ⊆ U ,
D−(A) = {X ⊆ U : |X| < |A|} .
In English there is no synthetic determiner, say, min, whose denotation would
be the function D−, in such a way that a sentence like min doctors speak French
would mean that the number of French speakers is smaller than the number of
doctors. The absence of this determiner can be derived from the Conservativity
Constraint and also from the Witness Set Constraint, as we show.
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Lemma 13. The function D− is non-conservative.
Proof. Let B = {a, b} and A = {c}. On one hand, it is clear that B /∈ D−(A),
since |B| = 2, |A| = 1, and thus |B| ≮ |A|. On the other hand, note that
A∩B ∈ D−(A), because A∩B = ∅ and of course |∅| < |{c}|. As a consequence,
D− is non-conservative.
Lemma 14. For some sets A,B, the quantifier D−(A) does not have ap-
propriate witness sets to calculate whether B ∈ D−(A), whereby the function
D−cannot be expressed by any linguistic category.
Proof. Note that, for all proper subset A′ of A, |A′| < |A|. This means that all
proper subsets of A belong to D−(A). Therefore, the set of witness sets for A
is
W [D−(A)] = {A′ : A′ ⊂ A} = P(A)−A.
We shall show that the elements of W [D−(A)] cannot be used reliably to calcu-
late, for some A, B, whether B ∈ D−(A) following monotonicity properties as
specified in the procedure proposed in (26) and as required by our Witness Set
Constraint.
Observe that the quantifier D−(A) is monotone decreasing: if B ∈ D−(A),
because |B| < |A|, then, for any subset B′ of B, |B′| < |A|, in which case
B′ ∈ D−(A). Accordingly, D− can be expressed by a linguistic category iff, for
all A,B ⊆ U (cf. (27-b),
(36)
B ∈ D−(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D−(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w).
Now consider, for instance, the situation where A = {a, b} and B = {c, d, e}.
The set of witness sets for D−(A) is
W [D−(A)] = {{a} , {b} , ∅} .
Note that all members of W [D−(A)] include A ∩ B, since ∅ is included in all
sets. However B /∈ D−(A), for |B| ≮ |A|. Indeed, when A∩B = ∅, biconditional
(36) is false: its right-hand is necessarily true, because the empty set is included
in all sets, and thus in all witness sets for D−(A); however this set-theoretical
truth does not entail the truth of B ∈ D−(A) for all A,B.
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Since (36) is false for some A,B, D− is not a legitimate denotation for a linguistic
category.
A further case study is the following non-logical (non-permutation invariant)
quantifier:
Definition 13. For all i ∈ U and all A ⊆ U ,
Di(A) = {B ⊆ U : i /∈ B −A} .
Let John ∈ U ; then B ∈ DJohn(A) iff John /∈ B − A. Again, English does
present sentences of the type DJohn doctors speak French, whose intended mean-
ing would be that John is a French speaker who is not a doctor.
Lemma 15. The function Di is non-conservative.
Proof. We shall prove that Di is non-conservative, since the following bicondi-
tional does not hold for all sets A,B:
B ∈ Di(A)⇔ (A ∩B) ∈ Di(A).
If we apply Definition 13 to this biconditional, we obtain the following bicondi-
tional:
i /∈ B −A⇔ i /∈ (A ∩B)−A.
Note that it is necessarily the case that (A ∩ B) − A = ∅; thus, for all A,B,
i /∈ (A ∩B)− A. But the necessary truth of this statement does not entail the
truth of i /∈ B −A. Hence, Di is non-conservative.
Lemma 16. For some sets A,B, the quantifier Di(A) does not have appropri-
ate witness sets, whereby the function Di cannot be expressed by any linguistic
category.
Proof. We can see that, for any A ⊆ U , if Di(A) 6= ∅, it has witness sets. Note
that, for any subset A′ of A, A′ − A = ∅. Consequently, for any A′ ⊆ A, i /∈
A′ −A, which means that the set of witness sets for Di(A) is
W [Di(A)] = P(A).
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Let B ∈ Di(A). By Definition 13, this means that i /∈ B−A. If this is the case,
then, for any B′ ⊆ B, i /∈ B′ − A, whereby B′ ∈ Di(A). Accordingly, Di(A) is
monotone decreasing.
Assume, for concreteness, that A = {a} and B = {b}. Then, the set of witness
sets for Db(A) is
W [Db(A)] = {{a} , ∅} .
Given that Db(A) is monotone decreasing, we shall conclude that it has appro-
priate witness sets iff the following biconditional holds (cf. (27-b)):
(37)
B ∈ Db(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [Db(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w).
Observe now that (37) is false. On one hand, B − A = {b}; thus, b ∈ B − A.
Consequently, B /∈ Db(A), which means that the left-hand of the biconditional
is false. On the other hand, the right-hand is true, since A ∩ B = ∅, which
is included in all witness sets for Db(A). This violates the appropriateness
requirement specified in (27-b) of the Witness Set Constraint: Db(A) lacks a
witness set that is appropriate to calculate the truth of B ∈ Db(A) for some
sets A,B.
4.2 Cardinal comparison
We shall now study one-place cardinal comparative determiners constructed on
the basis of cardinality relations between two sets. None of these determiners are
conveyed by synthetic linguistic categories. They are all correctly banned by the
Conservativity Constraint, and also by the Witness Set Constraint, as we shall
argue. The investigation of these determiners provides us with a richer picture
of the different ways in which the Witness Set Constraint filters out mathe-
matical functions and allows us to corroborate that the proposed constraint, if
accurately defined, does not let in certain determiners that map properties into
quantifiers that cannot be computed on the basis of monotonicity properties
following procedure (26).
Definition 14. For all U and all A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D<(A)⇔ |A| < |B| .
English does not present sentences such as blik doctors speak French, which
would claim that the set D of Doctors has a smaller cardinality than the set F
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of French speakers. This gap can be accounted for on the basis of the Conser-
vativity Constraint and the Witness Set Constraint.
Lemma 17. The function D< is non-conservative.
Proof. Let B ∈ D<(A); then, |A| < |B|. However, |A| ≥ |A ∩B|, because, for
all sets A,B, A ∩B ⊆ A; thus A ∩B /∈ D<(A).
Lemma 18. For all U and all A ⊆ U , the non-empty quantifier D<(A) has
no witness set, whereby the function D< cannot be expressed by any linguistic
category.
Proof. For all A′ ⊆ A, |A| ≮ |A′|, whereby there is no subset of A that belongs
to D<(A), i.e., no witness set for D<(A). This does not entail, though, that
D<(A) = ∅.
Definition 15. For any U and any A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D 6=(A)⇔ |A| 6= |B| .
Lemma 19. The function D 6= is non-conservative.
Proof. Let A = {a} and B = {a, b}; then, B ∈ D 6=(A) because |A| = 1 and
|B| = 2. However, A ∩B /∈ D 6=(A), since A ∩B = A.
Lemma 20. For all U , if A = ∅, then the non-empty quantifier D 6=(A) has no
witness set, whereby the function D 6= violates the Witness Set Constraint.
Proof. Choose A = ∅ and B 6= ∅. Since |∅| 6= |B|, we can conclude that
B ∈ D 6=(A). In this case D 6=(A) 6= ∅, and nonetheless D 6=(A) has no witness
set: A has a single subset A′, namely ∅, which does not belong to D 6=(A),
because |A| = |A′|. Since it is possible that D 6=(A) is non-empty and lacks
witness sets, the function D 6= is not a permissible denotation of a linguistic
category, according to the Witness Set Constraint.
Definition 16. For any U and any A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D>(A)⇔ |A| > |B| .
Lemma 21. The function D> is non-conservative.
Proof. Let A = {a, b} and B = {b, c, d}. Observe that B /∈ D>(A); thus,
B /∈ D>(A). However, A ∩ B = {b}, in which case (A ∩ B) ∈ D>(A), because
|A| > |A ∩B|.
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Lemma 22. For some sets A,B, the quantifier D>(A) does not have appro-
priate witness sets to calculate whether B ∈ D>(A), whereby the function D>
cannot be expressed by any linguistic category.
Proof. Note that, for any proper subset A′ of A, |A| > |A′|. Consequently, the
set of witness for D>(A) is
W [D>(A)] = P(A)−A.
Assume that |A| > |B|; then, for any subset B′ of B, |A| > |B′|. In other words,
(∀A,B) ((B ∈ D>(A) ∧B′ ⊆ B)⇒ B′ ∈ D>(A)).
Thus, D>(A) is monotone decreasing.
Given that D>(A) is monotone decreasing, we check whether D>(A) has ap-
propriate witness sets by verifying the following biconditional ((27-b)):
(38)
B ∈ D>(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D>(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) ⊆ w).
Let A = {a, b} and B = {c, d}. The set of witness sets for D>(A) is
W [D>(A)] = {{a} , {b} , ∅} .
Observe that A ∩ B = ∅, which is included in all elements of W [D>(A)]; con-
sequently, the right-hand of (38) is true. Nonetheless, the left-hand of (38) is
false, since
|{a, b}| ≯ |{c, d}| .
Therefore, there are some sets A,B for which the non-empty quantifier D>(A)
lacks appropriate witness sets.
Definition 17. For all U and all A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D≥(A)⇔ |A| ≥ |B| .
Lemma 23. The function D≥ is non-conservative.
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Proof. Let A = {a} and B = {a, b}. Then, B /∈ D≥(A), because |A|  |B|.
However, (A ∩B) ∈ D≥(A), since A = A ∩B.
Since B does not belong to D≥(A) and A∩B belongs to D≥(A), the determiner
D≥ is not conservative.
Lemma 24. For some sets A,B, the quantifier D≥(A) lacks appropriate wit-
ness sets to calculate whether B ∈ D≥(A), whereby the function D≥ cannot be
expressed by any linguistic category.
Proof. The set of witness sets for D≥(A) is
W [D≥(A)] = {A′ ⊆ A : |A| ≥ |A′|} = P(A).
D≥(A) is monotone decreasing: for all B′ ⊆ B, |A| ≥ |B| ⇒ |A| ≥ |B′|.
Thus, with the aim of deciding whether D≥(A) is permitted by the Witness Set
Constraint we must verify whether the following biconditional holds for all A,B
(cf. (27-b)):
(39)
B ∈ D≥(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D≥(A)] ∧ (B ∩A) ⊆ w).
Let A = {d} and B = {a, b, c}. Then, the left-hand of (39) is false, because
A  B. However, the right-hand of (39) is true; observe that the set of witness
sets is W [D≥(A)] = {{d} , ∅}, whose two elements include B ∩A = ∅.
Since there are sets A,B for which biconditional (39) is false, the function D≥
is not a possible denotation for a linguistic category, according to the Witness
Set Constraint.
Definition 18. For any U and any A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D≤(A)⇔ |A| ≤ |B| .
Lemma 25. The function D≤ is non-conservative.
Proof. Let A = {a} and B = {b, c}; then |A| = 1, |B| = 2 and |A ∩B| = 0.
Accordingly, B ∈ D≤(A), because 1 ≤ 2, and A ∩ B /∈ D≤(A), because 1 
0.
Lemma 26. For some sets A,B, the quantifier D≤(A) does not have appro-
priate witness sets to calculate whether A ∈ D≤(A), whereby the function D≤
cannot be the denotation of any linguistic category.
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Proof. There is solely one subset A′ such that |A| ≤ |A′|, namely A. Then,
W [D≤(A)] = {A}.
D≤(A) is monotone increasing: if |A| ≤ |B| then, for any C such that B ⊆ C,
A ≤ C. Thus, according to the Witness Set Constraint, D≤(A) is a legitimate
denotation for a linguistic category iff, for all A,B (cf. (27-a)):
(40)
B ∈ D≤(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D≤(A)] ∧ w ⊆ B).
Let A = {d} and B = {a, b, c}. In this case, we know that B ∈ D≤(A), because
|A| ≤ |B|. However, A, the unique witness set for D≤(A), is not included in B,
whereby there in no witness set for D≤(A) that is included in B. Since there
are sets A,B for which (40) does not hold, the function D≤ is banned by the
Witness Set Constraint.
Definition 19. For any U and any A,B ⊆ U ,
B ∈ D=(A)⇔ |A| = |B| .
Lemma 27. The function D= is non-conservative.
Proof. Let A = {a} and B = {b}. Then, B ∈ D=(A) and A ∩B /∈ D=(A).
Lemma 28. For some sets A,B, the quantifier D=(A) does not have appro-
priate witness sets to calculate whether B ∈ D=(A), whereby the function D=
cannot be expressed by any linguistic category.
Proof. For any set A, there is a single subset of A that belongs to D=(A),
namely A itself. Thus,
W [D=(A)] = {A} .
The quantifier D=(A) is clearly non-monotonic. As a consequence, it is permit-
ted by the Witness Set Constraint iff, for all A, B (cf. (27-c)):
(41)
B ∈ D=(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [D=(A)] ∧ (A ∩B) = w).
Let A = {a, b, c} and B = {d, e, f}. In this case, the left-hand of the bicon-
ditional (41) is true, since |A| = |B|, whereas its second-hand is false, because
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A ∩ B = ∅ and ∅ /∈ W [D=(A)]. Since (41) is false for some sets A,B, the
function D= is filter out by the Witness Set Constraint.
4.3 Converses of non-trivial proportionality quantifiers
For any possible determiner denotation D we can define its converse Dc as
follows:
Dc(B,A) = 1⇔ D(A,B) = 1.
We bring this issue into consideration because only, when it is interpreted by a
non-conservative function, is the converse of all. Recall that JonlyK(B,A) = 1
iff A 6= ∅ and A ⊆ B, and that JallK(A,B) = 1 iff A 6= ∅ and A ⊆ B. In this
subsection we shall show that the converses of relative proportional functions are
filtered out as denotations of linguistic categories by the Witness Set Constraint.
Let us begin by defining non-trivial proportionality quantifiers. Consider the
quantificational expression more than half (of), more 12 , whose denotation would




(A,B) = 1⇔ 2 · |A ∩B| > |A| .
This quantifier is just a particular instance of a larger class of proportional
quantifiers, which provide denotations for an infinity of quantificational expres-
sions such as more than one third (of), more than one forth (of ), etc. We can
characterize these proportional quantifiers in the following way:
Definition 20. Let m 6= 0 and nm such that 0 <
n





(A,B) = 1⇔ m · |A ∩B| > n · |A| .
Lemma 29. The function more nm is conservative.






(A,B) = 1⇔ more n
m
(A,A ∩B) = 1.
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Following Definition 20 of proportional quantifier, we rewrite (42) in terms of
(43):
(43)
m · |A ∩B| > n · |A| ⇔ m · |A ∩ (A ∩B)| > n · |A| .
Given that A∩B = A∩A∩B, (43) is a tautology. Therefore, we conclude that
more nm is conservative.
Lemma 30. By Theorem 2 and Lemma 29, the determiner more nm satisfies
the Witness Set Constraint.











(B,A) = 1⇔ m · |B ∩A| > n · |B| .
The absence of the converses of non-trivial proportional determiners as linguistic
denotations is predicted by the Conservativity Constraint and the Witness Set
Constraint.
Lemma 31. The function [More nm ]
c is non-conservative.
Proof. The determiner [More nm ]
c is conservative iff, for all sets A, B :
(44) B ∈ [More nm ]
c(A)⇔ A ∩B ∈ [More nm ]
c(A).
If we apply Definition 21 of [More nm ]
c to (44), we obtain the following bicon-
ditional:
(45) m · |A ∩B| > n · |B| ⇔ m · |(A ∩B) ∩A| > n · |A ∩B|.
Observe that the |A ∩B| must be equal to |(A ∩B) ∩A|, because A ∩ B and
(A∩B)∩A are the same set; thus the first term of the left-hand inequality and
the first term of right-hand inequality of (45) are identical. However, it is not
necessary the case that the second terms n · |B| and n · |A ∩B| are identical,
because |B| can be different from |A ∩B|. Accordingly, biconditional (45) is
not necessarily true for all sets A,B, whereby [More nm ]
c is not a conservative
determiner.
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Let us illustrate the non-conservativity of this class of determiner. Choose
m = 6, n = 4, A = {a, b} and B = {a, b, d, e}; then, |A ∩B| = 2 and |B| = 4.
Observe that B /∈ [More 46 ]
c(A), because
6 · |A ∩B| = 12 ≯ 4 · |B| = 16.
However, A ∩B ∈ [More 46 ]
c(A), since
6 · |(A ∩B) ∩A| = 12 > 4 · |A ∩B| = 8.
Since B /∈ [More 46 ]
c(A) and A ∩ B ∈ [More 46 ]
c(A), we must conclude that
[More 46 ]
c is not conservative.
Lemma 32. For some sets A,B, the quantifier [More nm ]
c(A) does not have ap-
propriate witness sets to calculate whether B ∈ [More nm ]
c(A), whereby [More nm ]
c
cannot be expressed by a linguistic category.
Proof. A subset A′ of A is a witness for [More nm ]
c(A) iff it belongs to [More nm ]
c(A),
i.e, iff it satisfies the following condition:
(46) m · |A′ ∩A| > n · |A′|.
Observe that, for any A′ ⊆ A,A′ ∩ A = A′, and that m > n; this implies that
condition (46) is satisfied when |A′| 6= 0. Consequently, the set of witness sets





]c(A)] = P − ∅.
The quantifier [More nm ]
c(A) is not monotone increasing. Let m = 2 and n = 1.
Choose A = {a, b}, B = {a, b, c} and C = {a, b, c, d, e}. Observe that |A ∩B| =
2 and |B| = 3. Thus,
2 · |A ∩B| = 4 > 1 · |B| = 3.
Consequently, B ∈ [More 12 ]
c(A). Note that B ⊆ C and C /∈ Morec 12 (A),
since |A ∩ C| = 2, |C| = 5 and
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2 · |A ∩ C| = 4 ≯ 1 · |C| = 5.
The quantifier [More nm ]
c(A) is neither monotone decreasing. Assume that
m · |A ∩B| > n · |B|. Observe now that ∅ is a subset B′ of B for which
m · |A ∩B′| ≯ n · |B′|, since |A ∩ ∅| = |∅| = 0.
Therefore, [More nm ]
c(A) is non-monotonic. In order to determine whether
W [[More nm ]
c(A)] contains appropriate witness sets for [More nm ]
c(A) we must
check whether the following biconditional holds for all A,B:
(47)
B ∈ [More n
m
]c(A)⇔ (∃w) (w ∈W [[More n
m
]c(A)])(A ∩B = w).
Let m = 2 and n = 1. Consider the two sets A = {a, b} and B = {a, b, c, d} .
Then, B does not belong to [More 12 ]
c(A), because
2 · |A ∩B| = 4 ≯ 1 · |B| = 4,
in which case the left-hand statement of (47) is false. However, the subset A∩B
of A does belong to [More 12 ]
c(A), because
2 · |(A ∩B) ∩A| = 4 > 1 · |A ∩B| = 2.
Consequently, we must conclude that A ∩ B is a witness set for More nm
c(A),
in which case the right-hand of (47) is true.
Since (47) is false, the function [More nm ]
c is filtered out by the Witness Set
Constraint.
5 Discussion
In this article we have argued that the Witness Set Constraint determines what
functions from properties to generalized quantifiers are denoted by linguistic
categories. Our proposal has several interesting consequences for the under-
standing of what universal principles determine the set of possible determiner
denotations in natural languages.
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Firstly, the existence of conservative determiner denotations is expected if the
Witness Set Constraint is the semantic principle that determines the deter-
miner denotations that are linguistically legitimate: provably, all conservative
functions satisfy the Witness Set Constraint (Theorem 2).
Secondly, we can understand why inner negations (such as the allnon determiner
or the Jn̂K-determiners) are banned; these non-conservative functions are not
permitted because none of the generalized quantifiers associated to them have
witness sets. If witness sets are necessary to provide a feasible account for the
semantic processing of sentences with generalized quantifiers, as suggested by
Barwise and Cooper (1981), then we can understand the absence of these non-
conservative functions as a result of a simplicity condition that is required in
order to calculate the truth conditions of quantified statements in a simpler and
more realistic way.
Thirdly, certain familiar linguistic categories that have been argued to denote
non-conservative functions, namely only and the relative proportional deter-
miners many and few, map properties into generalized quantifiers that have
appropriate witness set when they are not empty sets. Therefore, their ex-
istence is anticipated by the Witness Set Constraint. Indeed, the inverse of
Theorem 2 does not hold, since there are functions that have appropriate wit-
ness sets and are non-conservative. We do not need to consider whether or
not only is a determiner from a syntactic viewpoint, whether the relative pro-
portional determiners are conservative on the second argument, or whether any
other operations, such as focalization, are involved in order to allow determiners
that are non-conservative on their first argument.
Fourthly, we have shown that certain mathematical quantifiers, such as cardinal
comparative quantifiers or the converses of non-trivial proportional quantifiers,
do have witness sets. However, these witness sets are not appropriate, in the
technical sense we have specified, to calculate the truth of some quantified state-
ments. The Witness Set Constraint correctly predicts that the functions that
yield these quantifiers are not possible denotations of linguistic categories.
In sum, not only the absence of certain non-conservative categories but most
interestingly the existence of certain non-conservative categories can be derived
from a presumable constraint involved in the semantic processing of general-
ized quantifiers. This indicates the empirical superiority of the Witness Set
Constraint compared to the Conservativity Constraint.
Finally, we would like to remark that the approach developed in these pages,
according to which it is a constraint on semantic processability that restricts
the set of generalized quantifiers permitted in natural languages, has a more
restrictive and accurate power of definability than the argument developed by
Keenan and Stavi (1986). According to this argument (informally sketched in
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section 1.2), natural language determiners would need to be conservative as a
result of the boolean structure of natural language semantics. However, as noted
by van Benthem (1983), every binary relation between subsets of a universe can
be defined using boolean operations, “for every such relation may be viewed
as a (finite) disjunction of singleton cases” (cf. van Benthem 1983, p. 455 for
a detailed discussion). This “simple amendment” introduced by van Benthem
allows us to generate inner negations, such as allnon –as van Benthem himself
notes– and Jn̂K-determiners). This leads us “to excessive power of definability”,
since finite disjunctions of singletons generate non-attested determiners that
indeed are non-conservative, such as inner negations.
Therefore, the Witness Set Constraint is not only empirically but also theoret-
ically superior to the Conservativity Constraint, to the extent that the Wit-
ness Set Constraint can be naturally motivated in terms of processing strate-
gies, whereas the above-mentioned attempt to motivate the Conservativity Con-
straint is formally problematic.
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